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Göttingen  MAGKS XII-1
Biased Quality Investments and 
Organisational Structures in Network 
Industries – 
An Application to the Railway Industry




This paper analyses the incentives to upgrade input quality in vertically related (network) industries. 
Upstream investments have a biased effect on the downstream companies and lead to vertical 
product differentiation. Different vertical structures such as vertical integration, ownership and legal 
unbundling lead to different investments. We find that, without regulation, vertical integration and 
legal unbundling regimes provide highest investment incentives and lead to highest welfare. 
However, we also find foreclosure in the downstream market if the potential degree of horizontal 
product differentiation of the entrant is low. Under ownership unbundling, investment incentives are 
lower but there is never foreclosure of the entrant since this would worsen double marginalisation. 
When the network operator is subject to a break-even regulation, the investment incentives are 
crowded out under legal and ownership unbundling whereas they remain nearly unchanged under 
vertical integration. Welfare and consumer surplus decrease under legal unbundling, but increase 
under the two other regimes.
JEL classification: D2, D4, L43, L51, L92
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 1 Introduction
During the last thirty years there has been a growing body of literature on pros and cons concerning 
vertical integration of formerly state-owned monopolies in the postal, energy, telecommunication, 
and railway sectors. For the railway industry, this topic has gained more importance since the 
beginning of the 1990ies when the European Union issued the Directive 91/440 (EU 1991) followed 
by the three so-called railway packages. The reference point of this directive for the member states 
is to establish at least separate accounting entities for service provision and infrastructure (essential 
facility) management in the railway industries and to allow for competition in and for the market 
respectively. In Article 1 it is stated: “The aim of this Directive is to facilitate the adoption of the 
Community railways to the needs of the Single Market and to increase their efficiency; [...] by 
separating the management of railway operation and infrastructure from the provision of railway 
transport services, separation of accounts being compulsory and organizational or institutional 
separation  being  optional,  [...].”
1  It  is worth  noting  that the law  does not prescribe  full 
organisational vertical separation, but only accounting separation.
Interestingly, economic literature with regard to these industries generally considers complete 
vertical integration or separation although these forms remain rare exceptions in reality. To our 
knowledge, Crémer/ Cremer/ De Donder (2006) (henceforth: CCD (2006)) and Höffler/ Kranz 
(2011a/b) (henceforth: HK (2011a/b)) are the first to introduce legal unbundling to economic theory 
even though this organisational form is quite common in deregulated network industries. The key 
assumption in these models is that the unbundled entity maximises its profit independently of its 
parent company and acts, consequently, as if it were independent. Accordingly, an important 
consequence   is   that   downstream   competition   can   spread   on   a   level-playing   field   without 
discrimination.
CCD (2006) examine the network operator's incentives to invest under different organisational 
regimes. In their model the downstream companies constitute the unbundled entities which compete 
à la Bertrand. They find that the network operator tends to invest the more the more downstream 
companies he owns because he considers not only his own profit but equally that of his affiliates.
2 
HK (2011a/b) look at the reverse case where the upstream company, the network provider, is 
unbundled. This assumption is meant to reflect current European legislation more appropriately. 
1 Angenendt (2007) provides an overview of the unbundling guidelines in the different network industries as 
implemented in German law.
2 The vertical integration case where the entire company over all productions steps maximises its profits is not 
considered.XII-3
They focus on the question of which regime provides highest quantities, given a fixed investment 
budget, in the downstream market when non-price discrimination is possible. They find that legal 
unbundling achieves this because there is no sabotage incentive, and double marginalisation is 
moderated. One contribution of our paper is to expand this analysis to a context with endogenous 
investments and with both horizontally and vertically differentiated products, which seems to be 
particularly important in the railway sector.
3
Providing high quality services necessitates not only investment in rolling stock, but equally in the 
network, e.g. to allow for high-speed services and more comfort through reduced tyre-noise. The 
analysis of investments in railway infrastructure is of high importance because the share of 
infrastructure cost makes up to 60% of total industry cost which is far more than in other network 
industries.
4  Investments in input quality as considered in our paper, often favour one of the 
downstream companies, commonly the incumbent, because it has a lead over the entrants 
concerning the use of high-tech products in the industry. This means that building or upgrading 
tracks often favours specific transportation modes that attract different types of final customer 
demand with immediate repercussion on the profits of the network operator and the Train Operating 
Companies (TOCs). Moreover, claims are that an integrated network operator may tend to invest in 
a way that the services he offers will be favoured.
5 Note that these investments often create new 
demand. For instance, new consumers that used to choose other transportation modes may switch to 
the railway once high-speed train services become available.
6
With regard to Great Britain's privatisation experience Gómez-Ibánez (2003) sums this point up by 
stating that the routeing of the tracks was often as important as the correspondent origin-destination 
pair and that “the various TOCs that used the West Coast Main Line had to agree not only on 
whether the line should be upgraded but in which types of services should be favoured in the 
design. Operators of slower freight and regional passenger services needed different tracks, signal, 
and power distribution systems than the operators of the high-speed services. The broad range of 
issues in dispute made it much harder to develop a consensus on the appropriate design [...].
7
3 e.g. in Germany one can choose at least among three different options to travel by train from Frankfurt/ Main central 
station to Bonn central station: taking the local train/ the Intercity/ the Intercity Express takes 2:51h/ 1:58h/ 1:39h. 
So, there is product differentiation at least in two dimensions, comfort and duration of the journey. (www.bahn.de, 
February 11, 2010).
4 cf. Gómez-Ibánez (2003), p. 328.
5 cf. Mofair (2009), p. 114, for an example of the German market and The Economist (2010) for the North American 
case.
6 There is also a macro dimension of investments in high-speed rail since it may contribute to bring regions closer 
together and to promote economic activity. See e.g. Ahlfeldt/ Feddersen (2010).
7 Gómez-Ibánez (2003), p. 334.XII-4
We model this potential tension by allowing investments of the upstream network operator to have a 
biased effect on downstream companies leading to quality differentiation. To capture the differences 
among the services supplied by the various TOCs, we also allow their products to be horizontally 
differentiated. Using this set-up,  we find that, without regulation,  vertical integration and legal 
unbundling regimes provide highest investment incentives and lead to highest welfare. However, 
for low levels of horizontal product differentiation, the entrant is foreclosed because investments 
raise the access charge. Under ownership unbundling, investment incentives are lower but there is 
never foreclosure of the entrant since this would increase double marginalisation and reduce the 
network operator's profits. When the network operator is subject to regulation, the investment 
incentives are wiped out under legal and ownership unbundling whereas they remain nearly 
unchanged   under   vertical   integration.   Welfare   and   consumer   surplus   decrease   under   legal 
unbundling, but increase for the two other regimes. As a comparison of our results with the findings 
of CCD (2006) and HK (2011a/b) show, accounting for product differentiation and allowing for 
demand-increasing investments in the upstream market changes conclusions considerably.
This paper is related to the vertical integration and investment literature. Two extensive overviews 
of research concerning vertical integration issues – without specific focus on network industries – 
are provided by Joskow (2005) and Riordan (2008). As mentioned above, CCD (2006) and HK 
(2011a/b) use a similar setting as we do in this paper.
In his survey,  Guthrie (2006) describes infrastructure investment incentives under different 
regulatory regimes. Investment incentives with vertical integration and separation are at the centre 
stage of Buehler's et al. (2004) article: They analyse a network provider's incentives to invest in 
quality upgrades and find that, in general, incentives are higher if companies are vertically 
integrated. Though, non-linear access prices may be a remedy and compensate for the dis-incentives 
of vertical separation. Foros (2004) analyses investments with spillovers of an integrated company 
that faces downstream competition in a regulatory regime where the regulator has limited 
commitment ability. Both companies differ in their production technology. He shows that access 
price regulation may lower welfare if the downstream companies do not differ too much. Vareda 
(2007) studies the quality and cost cutting investment incentives in a similar context. He finds that 
unbundling lowers the incentives for quality investment, but raises investment for cost-cutting. A 
lack of regulatory commitment may eliminate all investment incentives, so that no regulation may 
be superior.
Compared to these models, the contribution of this paper is threefold: First, we extend the analysis XII-5
of legal unbundling into a differentiated product context where investments are endogenous. 
Second, we analyse the specific case where these strategic investments are highly biased towards 
one of the downstream companies. Third, in contrast to Foros (2004), who also considers biased 
investments, we assume Bertrand competition which seems in the context of this paper the more 
appropriate way.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: In section 2, we present the model. Section 2.1 
provides the results for the unregulated benchmark case. Section 2.2 introduces a regulator into the 
model. Section 3 discusses briefly the model outcome if the entrant provides high quality services. 
Section 4 summarises, discusses limitations, and concludes.
 2 Organisational Structures and Quality Investments – The Model
We model a network industry, in which there is one network provider and two competing TOCs that 
offer horizontally differentiated services. The network provider offers the network at a uniform 
access charge to the TOCs. Moreover, it may invest in quality upgrading so that the services of one 
of the two downstream companies are favoured. Imagine e.g. that one of the companies could offer 
high-speed   train   services   but  without  investment  it  is  restricted   to   low-speed   because  the 
infrastructure is not adequate. Upgrading the tracks is costly for the network operator, but generates 
new demand because it enhances the willingness to pay for the high-speed services. However, it 
puts the TOC at a disadvantage that does not offer high speed trains since running these trains does 
not require the investment. Nonetheless, this TOC has also to pay for the higher quality via the 
access charge like the high speed train operator.
Demand Side
Final demand derives from a linear-quadratic utility function of a representative consumer where 










−sqEqI   (1)
The two downstream companies, called incumbent (I) and entrant (E), offer services to final 
customers.  The demands for the product of the incumbent and of the entrant are  qI  and  qE 
respectively. The final consumer prices are pI and pE respectively. 
The utility  function  in  equation  (1)  leads  to  the  well-known linear  demand  functions  for 
differentiated products:








2   (3)
s  is   the   exogenous   parameter   for   horizontal   product   differentiation,   where  s  =   1  means 
homogeneous and s = 0 independent products. The willingness to pay for products is normalised 
to 1. If the network operator upgrades quality by a factor  x, the willingness to pay for the 
incumbent's product increases by x. So, if investment takes place, products are horizontally and 
vertically differentiated. Moreover, the demand of the incumbent,  qI, also increases if there is 
investment, capturing the fact that quality investments are demand expanding.
As mentioned above, our specification allows for an analysis of both the interaction of freight and 
passenger rail, which would be classified as independent products in our framework, as well as for 
competition between intercity (IC) and local passenger services. The latter may be regarded as close 
substitutes on certain origin-destination pairs.
Compared to other frameworks often used in a product differentiation context, e.g. Hotelling 
models, the chosen linear-quadratic utility specification also captures the demand increasing effect 
of horizontal product differentiation.
9
Supply Side
At the supply side, there are one network operator and two downstream firms. The network operator 
gains revenue from selling network capacity to the downstream companies. It charges a uniform 
access charge a, and no discrimination among the downstream companies is possible. We limit the 
analysis to this type of access charge because they are common in the railway industry throughout 
Europe. In Germany, Deutsche Bahn Netz offered a menu of access tariffs between 1998 and 2001. 
Track user could choose among a two-part tariff and a linear tariff. If the TOC opted for the two part 
tariff it became holder of the “Infracard” which entitled it to use the tracks at a lower linear tariff 
compared to the standard uniform charge. This access tariff was deemed to be anti-competitive 
because it favoured the own downstream subsidiary.
10
The management of the network operator decides whether and how much to invest in quality 
upgrades. A quality upgrade x increases the willingness to pay and the demand for the products of 
one downstream company by the factor x. As customary in the industrial organisation literature, 
quality improvements are achieved through investment in fix costs rather than through higher 
9 cf. e.g. Martin (2002), ch. 3.6.
10 cf. Knieps (2006).XII-7
marginal or operating costs.
11 Here the investment cost is assumed to be quadratic. The network 
operator does not incur any other cost. δ is an efficiency parameter that is assumed to be larger than 
or equal to unity. The higher δ is the more costly is the investment for the network operator. The 





An incumbent I and an entrant E compete in the downstream market. They charge a final consumer 
price pI and pE, respectively, and pay a uniform access charge a to the upstream company. The 
access charge is the only cost that the downstream companies incur since we abstract from other 
marginal costs. Downstream profits Pi read
i=pi−aqi   (5)
where i = I, E.
Welfare Measures










−sqEqI−p I∗qIpE∗qE   (6)
Total welfare is 
W= IEUCS   (7)
Consumer surplus and producer surplus (sum of the profits) have an equal weight in the welfare 
function. Often, especially when explicitly considering the objectives of the regulatory agency it is 
assumed that profits have a lower weight in the objective function of the regulator. In this case 
welfare can be defined as W = CS + α (∑ Profits), where α ≤ 1.
12 Below we examine the effects on 
consumer surplus as a limiting case.
Organisational Forms
We consider three different organisational forms that are all relevant in the current political debate. 
First, we consider vertical integration with open access for competitors. The integrated company 
maximises the integrated profit,  i.e., it considers the effects that a change in prices on the 
11 cf. Beath/ Katsoulacos (1991) ch. 6 for a discussion of vertical product differentiation and see e.g. Foros (2004) and 
Katakorpi (2006) for recent applications.
12 cf. e.g. Armstrong/ Sappington (2007) and Guthrie (2006).XII-8
downstream level has on the upstream profits and vice versa. In the ownership unbundling regime, 
the upstream and the downstream companies maximise the profit on their own. When there is legal 
unbundling, the upstream company acts as if it were independent, i.e. it maximises its own profit, 
whereas the downstream parent company maximises the integrated profit. It is disputed in the 
political debate if this form separation with Chinese walls within one company is sufficient to 
guarantee independence of the network company. We examine below the effects of such a 
separation if it worked as intended.
Figure 1 shows the different organisational forms and the resulting industry structure:
We consider a non-regulated benchmark case and a scenario where a regulator fixes the access 
charge. Throughout the model the following assumption applies:
Assumption: x ≥  0
This assumption is necessary to guarantee that there is only quality upgrading and no downgrading.
 2.1 The Model without Regulator
The game is played for the three organisational scenarios and is solved recursively:
1. The upstream company decides on the access charge a and on the level x of the quality 
upgrade.
2. The downstream companies compete in prices (Bertrand competition).
 2.1.1 Price Competition Stage
At the second stage of the game, the downstream companies compete in prices. Formally, the 







The downstream incumbent maximises the following problem under ownership unbundling as does 
the entrant in all regimes:












i= pi−a∗qi   (9)
where i = I, E.

























When products are independent (s = 0) both downstream companies charge the monopoly price 




1x ,  p I
OU=1
2




1a  respectively. Under 
vertical integration, the access charge a is not relevant for the incumbent's pricing decision. This is 
due to the fact that the downstream company maximises the integrated profit so that the access 
charge is irrelevant.
With homogeneous products (s = 1) the investment x has a positive influence on the incumbent's 
price because it increases the consumers' willingness to pay, and a negative influence on the 
entrant's price:   p I
VI= pI
OU=ax
3   and   pE
VI= pE
OU=a−x
3 . When products are homogeneous, the 
entrant is driven out of the market as soon as there is quality upgrading because its equilibrium 
price is lower than the access charge. Without an entrant, there is no downstream competition, but a 
downstream monopoly. The profit maximisation problem is identical to that with independent 
products:   Substituting  s = 0   in   the   demand   function   of   the   incumbent   yields   the   quantity 
q = 1 + x – p. Profit maximisation again gives the following equilibrium prices, where the subscript 
M stands for monopoly:
13
13 For simplicity, we assume that the entrant cannot credibly threat to enter the market when there is monopoly so that 
the monopoly price persists. One can imagine this situation as if there were a very small amount ε of sunk cost 










These prices are equal to those reported above for the case that s = 0.
Under legal unbundling, the maximisation problem requires some discussion since the network 
operator is independent of the downstream parent company. At first sight, one could guess that the 
optimal values at the second stage of the game are equal to those under vertical integration (10). 
Under vertical integration, we assume that at both stages of the game the integrated company 
maximises the integrated profit. Accordingly, this also holds for the first stage when the access 
charge and the investment are chosen. But under legal unbundling, the case is different, the network 
operator chooses the access charge and the investment independently of the parent company. Hence 
by using the optimal values of (10), the upstream company might choose a combination of access 
charge and investment level that maximises its accounting profit, but drives the parent company 
into losses. Such can happen since the parent company maximises the integrated profit and offers 
downstream services as long as the integrated profit is larger than zero. This means that there is a 
margin squeeze which may be deemed anti-competitive. That is why we re-state the maximisation 






LU   (13)










pE  is increasing in a and decreasing in x and s. This means that the higher the level of vertical 
product differentiation, the lower the price of the entrant because from a consumer perspective the 
service of the entrant becomes less attractive. The negative relation to the level of horizontal 
product differentiation is straightforward: the less the products are differentiated, the fiercer is 
competition and the lower is the price.
In case the entrant does not enter the market, the monopoly solution is derived in the same way. XII-11
Setting pI = a guarantees that the integrated profit is maximised. The price is the same as under 
vertical integration, stated as equation (12). Accordingly, the downstream company that considers 
the integrated profit cannot do better because the double marginalisation effect is fully internalised.
 2.1.2 Investment and Access Charge Setting Stage
At this stage, the upstream company decides simultaneously on the access charge a and on the 
quality level  x. In the vertical integration scenario, the integrated company takes this decision 
jointly with the downstream parent company (i.e. considering that the investment influences the 
profit of the downstream parent company); in the legal unbundling and ownership unbundling 
scenarios, the case is different. The upstream company acts independently. This is evident in case of 
ownership unbundling because upstream and downstream companies are independent. In case of 
legal unbundling, the upstream company is owned by the downstream service provider that faces 
competition, but the network provider acts independently of its parent company.
For simplicity, we assume in this section that δ = 1 so that the investment cost is  x
2
2
, i.e. we 
analyse the outcomes for only one level of investment efficiency. We will relax this assumption in 
section Fehler: Referenz nicht gefunden in order to allow for different levels of efficiency.
Vertical integration
The vertically integrated company maximises the integrated profit, i.e., the sum of the upstream and 
the downstream profit as stated in equations (4) and (5), with respect to the access charge a and the 
quality level x. The maximisation problem with the reduced profit function takes the following form 










Maximisation yields the following optimal values for a and x. They depend only on the exogenous 
















Proposition 1: Under vertical integration, there is competition in the market if s < ½ º s
VI (qE > 0). 
The investment level x is larger than 0 if there is competition.
Proof: Inserting the optimal values for the access charge and the investment level (16) into the 





4 . This function is equal to zero at s
VI. The first 
derivative of this function with respect to s is negative for all values 0 ≤  s ≤  s
VI.■
Substituting the equilibrium a and x from equation (16) into the equilibrium prices of the second 






























This result can always be secured by setting a sufficiently high access charge. Note that, if there 
were no possibility for quality upgrading, the incumbent would never foreclose the market (qE > 0 
for all s).
14 This already shows that foreclosure stems from the fact that the quality investment is 
beneficial only to the incumbent and raises the willingness to pay only for its products.
Graphically, prices, access charge, and investment have the following form:
14 See the appendix for the results when there is no investment possibility. See Briglauer/ Götz/ Schwarz (2008) for a 
similar result.XII-13
Proposition 1 shows that the gain from selling access only dominates the adverse effect stemming 
from increased competition only if s < s
VI and therefore if the demand increasing effect of product 
differentiation is sufficiently high. Note also that the x-curve is slightly U-shaped implying that the 
incumbent reduces quality investment below the monopoly case. Higher access revenues more than 
compensate for the loss in willingness to pay. When products are independent (s = 0), the incumbent 
does not have an incentive to restrict entry because it benefits from selling access to the entrant 
without its downstream subsidiary loosing any traffic. At this point double marginalisation is 
highest. But the incumbent's incentives to restrict entry change the more the products become 
substitutes. At s
VI the profits of the entrant and of the network subsidiary are zero. All industry profit 
is realised within the incumbent's downstream unit. In the vertical integration regime the incumbent 
always charges a higher price than the entrant because it invests a positive amount of x which 
increases the willingness to pay of the consumers. 
Compared to a situation without investment possibility, allowing for the investment always alters 
welfare even when investing forecloses the market for the entrant. Here it becomes evident that this 
type of investment is not a dual problem to sabotage: Sabotage wastes resources and does not 
increase welfare whereas the investment can increases welfare because it leads to higher willingness 
to pay and to higher quantities in the market. Sabotage would only lead to higher profits of the firm 
that engages in sabotage.
Ownership Unbundling
The independent network provider maximises equation (4) with respect to a and x:


























1481−ss   and   x
OU= 2
741−ss . 




ensuing profit is  U
OU= 2
741−ss .
For s > s
OU, this combination of access charge and investment level would lead to foreclosure of the 
entrant. Therefore, we have to check if the network operator's maximisation problem changes to one 
in which he either 1) faces a downstream monopolist or 2) where he chooses a and x in a way to 
keep the entrant viable. That one that results in higher profits for the upstream company constitutes 
the equilibrium.
as to 1): It is straightforward to calculate the solution for the bilateral monopoly. In this case the 











*=1/21ax . Note that in this case, there is no horizontal product differentiation because 
there is only the incumbent in the market. The upstream firm's profit is  U
OU_M=1/6 .












The constraint says that the entrant always produces and sells a very small amount. The access 










.   Substituting   these 
equilibrium values into the equilibrium price from the second stage of the game (11) shows that 
a EA
OU= pE_EA
OU − is chosen just to allow the entrant to break even. In this case the profit of the 





Comparison of these results leads to
Proposition 2: Under ownership unbundling there is always competition in the market. There is an 
interior solution to the maximisation problem (20) for s < s
OU.
 For less differentiated products the 
network operator sets a and x so that the entrant enters with a very small quantity ε. The investment 
level x is larger than 0 except for s = 1.
Proof: For  ss
OU ,  U
OUU_EA
OU U
OU_M  and  U
OUU





This result shows that it is always optimal for the upstream firm to accommodate entry in order to 
reduce double marginalisation. Note that the entrant constitutes an effective constraint to the pricing 
power of the incumbent as soon as he is active. Under Bertrand competition an entrant selling a 
very small quantity provides sufficient competition to moderate the double marginalisation 
problem. 





























Under ownership unbundling the prices of the incumbent are always higher than those of the entrant 
if s < 1. This is due to the investment that increases the willingness to pay for the services of the 































Graphically prices, access charge, network profits, and investment are depicted in Figure 3:
Compared to a situation without investment possibility, the downstream company can increase 
profits by investing. Here it faces a trade-off: The more it invests, the more the equilibrium access 
charge increases and so do quantities of the downstream incumbent. But the quantities of the entrant 
decrease until they are driven down to    at s
OU. This trade-off of vertical product differentiation 
interacts with horizontal product differentiation: The more homogeneous the products are, the 
smaller is the margin per quantity sold (p - a). The investment in vertical product differentiation 
works against the entrant because it loses customers and cannot outweigh this effect by reducing its 
price since the access charge reflects the investment. But the network owner has an incentive to 
keep the entrant in the market with a very small quantity      in order to reduce the double 
marginalisation effect. This is why the network operator reduces investments from s
OU on until x = 0 
for s = 1. When there is neither horizontal nor vertical product differentiation prices are driven 
down to the level of downstream costs, i.e., the access charge.
Figure 3: Equilibrium Prices, Access Charge, and Investment (OU) (Benchmark)
1











x, a, pI, pEXII-17
Legal Unbundling
Under legal unbundling, the network company takes the decision on the access charge and the level 
of quality upgrading on its own although it is owned by the incumbent downstream company. 
In the first stage of the game, the network operator maximises its profit with respect to the access 
charge and the level of quality upgrading by substituting (14) into the demand function (2) and (3) 




















The ensuing (accounting) profit is:  U= 3s
2
166s4s
. With these equilibrium values, we can 
analyse the quantity of the entrant which is  qE=
s3s−1
s−183s4s
. qE > 0 is valid as long as
s1/213−3 .  Hence,   there   are   two   companies   in   the   market   if   services   are   highly 
differentiated unless the network operator can cause a downstream monopoly by setting another 
combination of access charge and level of quality upgrading. The network operator would do so if 
the monopoly profit is higher than the competitive profit.
The monopoly profit under legal unbundling is the same as in the vertical integration case with 
U
M=1/2   and   aM
LU=xM
LU=pM
LU=1   since the downstream company sets  pI  = a  independent of 
whether there is competition or a monopoly outcome in the downstream market. We can see from 
the equilibrium access charge for the monopoly case that the entrant is foreclosed because the 
access charge amounts to the maximum willingness to pay for the services of the entrant. As we 
assume a very small amount of sunk entry cost, there is no entry.
Hence, to see for which values of s the monopoly solution yields higher profits than the competitive 
solution, we equate  U
M  and  U  for all  s1/213−3 . The network profit functions intersect XII-18
at  s
LU≡1/211−3  so that we can derive
Proposition 3: Under legal unbundling there is competition in the market for s < s
LU. For less 
differentiated products the network operator sets a and x in a way that the monopoly outcome 
results.
Proof:  For  s < s
LU   U
LUU
LU_M   holds. For  s < s
LU   U
LU_MU
LU∧aM
LU≥pE   so that no entry 
occurs.■
Accordingly, prices, investment, and access charge take the following form:
This result is interesting since one would presume that legal unbundling would increase competition 
as intended. This does not happen because the downstream parent company shifts all its market 
power to the network operator in order to maximise joint profits.
 2.1.3 Comparison and Interpretation
The results from the three scenarios of the previous section are compared with regard to consumer 
surplus and overall welfare because both measures should be considered when deciding on the 
organisational form. Welfare is defined as the sum of all industry profits and the net consumer 
surplus as utility minus spending on services (cf. equations (6) and (7)).
To do this, different ranges with respect to the parameter for horizontal product differentiation, s, 
have been defined above:






















Table 1: Market Outcomes for VI, OU, and LU
The welfare, the consumer surplus, and investment functions for all three regimes look as follows:
Investments are higher under vertical integration and legal unbundling compared to ownership 
unbundling. This results from the fact that the network operator under own ownership unbundling 
only partially internalises the effect of its investment on the downstream market. This is different 
under vertical integration. The integrated company has two instruments available: It can choose a 
high level of investment in order to maximise own downstream profits quite independently of 
choosing an access charge that generates high revenue from the entrant. When products are better 
horizontally substitutable, the integrated company chooses high investments in order to foreclose 
the entrant to avoid strong competition. Under legal unbundling, the network operator disposes only 
of one instrument to maximise (accounting) profits: the access charge. Hence, it must compromise 
between investing a large amount which drives the access charge up and generates more revenues 
from the incumbent downstream company by reducing the revenues from the entrant (and vice 
versa). Accordingly, the investment level is lower when products are poor substitutes. But the 
monopoly investment level is realised for highly differentiated product since the (downstream) 
parent company aims at joint profit maximisation and shifts all the market power to its upstream 
subsidiary.
15
15 See section 2.1.2.


































From a welfare perspective, vertical integration and legal unbundling are always superior to 
ownership unbundling. This stems from the fact that investments are higher and that there is less 
double   marginalisation.  Vertical  integration   yields   higher   welfare   and   consumer   surplus   as 
compared to legal unbundling for low levels of product differentiation, i.e. s < s
VI.
 At this point the 
welfare and consumer surplus functions for the legal unbundling regime exhibit a jump since the 
network   provider   chooses   –   via   his   investment  decision   –   a   downstream  monopoly.  This 
downstream monopoly yields the same welfare and consumer surplus as the vertical integration 
monopoly.
For s
LU < s < s
VI legal unbundling is superior to vertical integration since the outcome of a vertically 
integrated monopolist is attained. This results is due to the fact that the downstream incumbent 
always sets  pI = a  under legal unbundling. This is better from a welfare and consumer surplus 
perspective because under legal unbundling the company charges a price that is as high as the 
investment level, but under vertical integration the price exceeds the investment level.
Moreover it is interesting to have a look at the disaggregated profit functions of the incumbent. 
Under legal unbundling all the profit is realised within the upstream company whereas under 
vertical integration and with competition in the market, most part of the profit comes from the 
downstream unit of the vertically integrated company. This result is due to the fact that the 
integrated profit is maximised in both stages of the game, i.e. it is profit enhancing for the entire 
company to set a low access charge if products show a high degree of differentiation because the 
business stealing effect is not very large. In contrast, under legal unbundling the network operator 
maximises its profit by only using the access charge so that it charges more than would result if 
integrated profit maximisation were done. In the monopoly case, profits are not separable under 
vertical integration.
Prices and investments as well as the disaggregated profit functions are depicted in the following 
graphs for the relevant range of 0 < s < s
VI.
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 2.1.4 Variations of the Efficiency Parameter δ
In the sections above, we assumed that the efficiency parameter is δ = 1. In this section we relax this 
assumption and show that the main results are robust when δ takes values larger than unity. The 
higher the efficiency parameter the more costly it is for the network operator to increase the 
willingness to pay for and the demand for the incumbent's services.
The maximisation problems are the same as stated in equations (15), (20) as well as (24).
In the vertical integration regime, the new equilibrium values for the access charge and the 













.  In this case the entrant is active in the market for 
s1− 1
2 . The investment level and access charge are negatively related to δ. This means that 
upgrading the network becomes less attractive to the incumbent if the cost is higher. If he invests 
less, he charges a (slightly) lower access price to the entrant.
The monopoly result is realised for all   s1− 1
2 .  The investment level of   xM
VI= 1
2−1   is 
sufficient to foreclose the entrant from entering the market.
16 There is no foreclosure for any s as δ 
16 Substituting xI_M
VI into  the  equilibrium   quantity  from   the  second   stage  of  the  game  shows   that   for  any
s1−1/2 the quantity of the entrant is negative. This means that the investment level is high enough to 
Figure 6:  LHS: Prices and Investments for s
LU < s < s
VI (Benchmark)
























converges to infinity. In this case, there is no investment and the access charge is equal to a = ½. 
This is the result from the model where no quality investments are possible.
17
Including δ in the ownership unbundling maximisation problem yields the following equilibrium 




  and   x
OU= 2
42−s1s−1 .  Both   access   charge   and 
investment level are negatively related to the efficiency parameter. In contrast to the vertical 
integration regime where the access charge is only paid by the entrant, in the ownership unbundling 
case the network operator has no incentive to raise the access charge with δ because this would 
reduce traffic and decrease its profits. Instead, the network operator reduces investments when they 
become less efficient.
The   threshold   for   which   the   maximisation   problem   of   the   network   operator   changes   is 
s≡9−2/−1/2 .  As   shown   for   the   specific   case   above,   he   would   choose   the   entry 














s9−2/−1/2 . For δ converging to infinity, the entry accommodation case does not apply 
here because the threshold value for s equals unity. If so, the access charge equals a = ½, and the 
investment level is zero. 






18 i.e. the less efficient the investment is the smaller the area in terms 
of s where the monopoly equilibrium applies. The equilibrium access charge and the investment 








2 . Both   are 
negatively related to changes in δ since it becomes more costly to invest if the efficiency worsens. 
With δ converging to infinity the access charge converges to ½, and there is no investment any 
more.
foreclose the entrant from entering the market and hence, that the monopoly result is stable.
17 See the results in the appendix.
18 This is the critical s at which the competitive profit equals the monopoly profit. Technically, there would be positive 
quantities of the entrant for all s1−416
2−1−2
2




. As soon as the monopoly profit is higher than the profit under competition, the 
network operator would choose the monopoly outcome. With the monopoly equilibrium values for the access charge 
and the investment level, the monopoly can be sustained. See the reasoning in section 2.1.2 that applies here, too.XII-23











These results show that the propositions established in this chapter are robust to the introduction of 
a variable efficiency parameter when there is no regulation of the upstream market.
 2.2 The Model with Regulator
Regulated   prices   for   bottleneck   resources   are   a   characteristic   of   most   network   industries. 
Introducing a regulator adds a step into the game which now takes the following form:
1. The regulator chooses the welfare-maximising access charge  a  under a zero profit 
constraint for the network company.
2. The upstream company decides on the investment level x.
3. The downstream companies compete in prices (Bertrand competition).
When the regulator chooses the access charge before the upstream company decides how much to 
invest means that the regulator can credibly commit not to expropriate the network company.
19 With 
this assumption of omniscience we abstract from problems like e.g. information asymmetries. The 
regulator can determine the access charge a but cannot enforce the investment level x. Insofar he 
can reach a second best solution.
 2.2.1 Price Competition Stage
The   price   competition   stage   remains   unchanged   under   vertical   integration   and   ownership 
unbundling. Hence, the results from section 2.1.1 apply here as well. The case is different for legal 
unbundling: We do not need to assume that the downstream unit of the legally unbundled company 
sets pI = a in this case because the network operator's profit is regulated down to zero. Hence, the 
entire company would make zero profits if  pI  =  a. Accordingly, for legal unbundling under 
regulation,   the  maximisation   problem  stated   as   equation  (8)  applies   here  and   not   that   of 
equation (13).
 2.2.2 Investment Stage
The maximisation problems are similar to those established in section 2.1.2 except that the network 
19 If we assumed that the regulator cannot commit, this assumption would need to reverse the order of steps 1 and 2.XII-24
operator only decides on the level of quality upgrading because the access charge is set by the 
regulator.
In case of vertical integration/ ownership unbundling/ legal unbundling, the integrated company 














The interpretation of the term for the ownership and legal unbundling regimes is easy: As long as 
the regulator allows a mark-up on the upstream marginal cost (a > 0), the network operator invests. 
Investments are highest for s = 0 and s = 1.
In the vertical integration regime, the case is a bit more complex. All else being equal, the integrated 
company invests more because it earns not only from the access charge, but it also considers the 
direct effect of increasing the willingness to pay as well as the demand when it invests in  x. 
Therefore a change in a does only affect very few the marginal rate of investment (first derivative of 
x with respect to a) for low and intermediate levels of vertical product differentiation. The reason 
for this is that the integrated company has two instruments available to maximise profits: it 
optimises the access charge with respect to the entrant's price reaction whereas the investment is 
chosen in order to maximise the profit of the own downstream subsidiary.
 2.2.3 Access Charge Setting Stage
At the first stage of the game, the regulator chooses the welfare-maximising access charge subject 








where the asterisk denotes the fact that the reduced functions are used here.
20
In this section, we chose the case of a zero-profit regulation for the network operator, not because 
that we think this is the most realistic assumption but to highlight one of our results: If investments 
20 Alternatively, the problem can also be solved by inserting the equilibrium investment levels from equations (26) and 
(27) into the relevant profit function of the network operator and by solving that for a.XII-25
of the upstream company in a vertically related industry benefit much the companies in the 
downstream market, it is not reasonable to vertically separate the companies in the industry if the 
network operator can (not) only partially skim the profits of its investments.
Proceeding like this requires that even the vertically integrated operator has accounting separation. 
This is in line with European legislation as stated in Directive 91/440 (EU 1991), article 1. 
Nonetheless, the vertical integration case is ex ante different from the legal unbundling regime 
because there, the upstream company acts independently of its downstream parent company.
Vertical Integration











A   (29)
where an asterisk denotes the equilibrium prices from the third stage of game, R stands for 






























With these values follows:
Proposition 4: When products are highly differentiated (s <  sR
VI ) there is competition in the market.
Proof: See the case without regulator.■
This leads to positive quantities for the incumbent and the entrant as long as s <  sR
VI
.
For less differentiated products (s >  sR
VI ), there is no entry, and the monopoly results are obtained. 
These are equivalent to those of section 2.1.2.
Hence, in the following we only have to compare the outcomes of the regulated case and the 
unregulated benchmark for s <  sR
VI . The price of the incumbent is higher than that of the entrant 
because the investment increases the willingness to pay for its products. The investment is nearly 
unchanged, but the access charge is lower since regulation deprives the network unit of all its 
market power. This is the reason why entrant's price and quantities are higher.XII-26
Ownership Unbundling
Under ownership unbundling, the regulator maximises the welfare maximisation problem stated as 





 where the 
second value leads to negative quantities of the entrant because it is larger than unity for any s. 
Hence it does not constitute a possible solution for the economic problem. Therefore the regulator 
sets a = 0. With an access charge that is larger than 0, he would drive the entrant out of the market. 
The resulting monopoly welfare would be inferior for any s to that of the competitive situation even 
though there is no investment in quality upgrades when a = 0.
Proposition 5: Under ownership unbundling, regulation of the network operator leads to zero 
investment.
Proof: Straightforward from equation (27) when substituting the equilibrium access fee a = 0.■




2−s   (31)
The results are identical for both downstream companies since they are assumed to be symmetric. 
The only way to differentiate vertically is to supply higher quality input. This does not happen if 
a = 0.
Prices are strictly decreasing in  s. The more intense competition is, the lower are the prices. 
Quantities show a U-form. Here we have to discern the product differentiation and the price effect. 
Figure 7: LHS: Prices, Investments and Access Charge VI (Regulation)
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First, moving away from totally differentiated products, the product differentiation effect outweighs 
the price effect: quantities are falling because less variety is available. From s = ½ on, the price 
effect is stronger than the product differentiation effect so that quantities are increasing. This is due 
to the fact that prices are strategic complements under Bertrand competition so that the reaction of 
one firm on a decision of the other becomes more aggressive the better the products are 
substitutable. Prices are equal to marginal cost (pI  =  pE  = 0  in this case) when products are 
homogeneous.
Compared to the unregulated benchmark case, investments and also the access charge are lower. 
The access charge is regulated down to marginal costs, which are equal to zero. This is done since 
the competitive effect of a zero access charge outweighs the positive effect that investment (and a 
positive access charge) has on only one downstream firm. Prices, access charge, and investment are 
the same under regulation and without regulation for s = 1.
Legal Unbundling
When the incumbent company is legally unbundled, the regulator maximises equation  (28)  by 
substituting the equilibrium level of investment from equation (27) into the maximisation problem. 
The regulator chooses a = 0 as in the ownership unbundling regime. This can be stated as
Proposition 6:  Under legal unbundling with regulation, there is no investment. The resulting 
equilibrium values are identical to those in the ownership unbundling regime.
Proof: Straightforward from equation (27) when substituting the equilibrium access fee a = 0 .■
Even though investing could increase the company's (aggregate) profits (see the vertical integration 
regime), the network operator has no incentive because it only considers its own profit which is 
Figure 8: LHS: Prices, Investments and Access Charge OU (Regulation)
RHS: Changes of Investment and Access Charge compared to Benchmark Case
pI  pE
a  x  0
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negative if x > 0 is chosen. The high investment level without regulation is possible because in the 
non-regulated case, the downstream company shifts all its market power to the upstream subsidiary 
by setting pI = a and maximises the aggregated profit in this way. This does not work here since the 
upstream company is regulated to zero profits.
Prices, investments, and access charge under legal unbundling are plotted in the following graph:
 2.2.4 Comparison and Interpretation
As in the model without regulator the results from the three scenarios of the previous sections are 
compared with regard to consumer surplus and overall welfare. Moreover, differences in the 
outcome compared to the regulated benchmark are discussed.
When there is a regulator we only have to distinguish two different ranges of horizontal product 






Table 2: Market Outcomes for VI, OU, and LU under Regulation
The welfare, the consumer surplus, and investment functions for all three regimes look as follows:
Figure 9: LHS: Prices, Investments and Access Charge LU (Regulation)
RHS: Changes of Investment and Access Charge compared to Benchmark Case
pI  pE
a  x  0
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From a welfare-perspective, vertical integration is superior to the ownership and the legal 
unbundling regimes, since the network company invests. This increases the incumbent's profits and 
consumer surplus more than it reduces the entrant's profits compared to ownership and legal 
unbundling.
In contrast to the unregulated benchmark case, there is no double marginalisation here because the 
network operator's profits are regulated down to zero. As discussed in section 2.2.3 investments are 
nearly unchanged, but the access charge is lower. This is why the profits of the integrated company 
are   smaller   whereas   the   profits   of   the   entrant   and   consumer   surplus   are   higher:
∣I∣∣U∣∣E∣∣CS∣.
Under OU, consumer surplus is larger the less the products are differentiated because the stronger is 
price competition. At s  = 1  consumer surplus and welfare coincide because with intense price 
competition profits in the downstream market are driven down to zero.
Compared to a situation without regulation, regulation increases welfare and consumer surplus. This 
stems from the fact the downstream companies do not have market power any more due to vertical 
product differentiation because all investment incentives are wiped out and the access fee is 
eliminated. Hence companies charge lower consumer prices. When competition is weak, both 
downstream companies make higher profits than in the unregulated case, but profits are driven 
down to zero when horizontal product differentiation converges to s = 1. The price effect outweighs 
Figure 10:  Equilibrium Welfare, CS, and Investment (Regulation)
Changes in Welfare, CS, and Investment (Regulation vs. Benchmark)
OU  LU
VI
































































the product differentiation effect. Hence consumer surplus is highest when companies do not have 
market power and charge low prices.
Comparison of the regulated LU results with the non-regulated benchmark case shows that welfare 
and consumer surplus are lower. To verify this for consumer surplus, consider the CS function from 
equation (6) and substitute the demand functions (2) and (3) into it. This yields a consumer surplus 
function that only depends on pI, pE, x and s. The partial derivatives show that changes in either pI, 








dx ∣  
where prices changes are negatively and changes in the investment level are positively related to 
consumer surplus. When we compare the prices and the investment without and under regulation, 
we see the changes of the investment level outweigh the sum of the price changes as illustrated in 
Figure 11. This is why consumer surplus is lower under regulation than without regulation:
 
Industry profits are also lower under regulation. Without regulation, there was no profit for the 
parent company of the legally unbundled network operator, there was a positive profit for the 
entrant for s < s
LU, and the most profit was realised within the legally unbundled upstream business 
unit. This source of profit is wiped out through regulation. So, the companies face at the most 
horizontal product differentiation which gives them some market power. As competition increases 
profits go down to zero.
Figure 11: Changes in Investments and in Prices (Regulation vs. Benchmark)
pI  pE
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 2.2.5 Variations of the Efficiency Parameter δ
To begin with the easy cases of ownership and legal unbundling: As the regulator sets a = 0 for any 
relevant value of δ, there is no investment. Hence, it does not matter how efficient the investment 
is.
21
In case of vertical integration, the maximisation problem is the same as described in sections Fehler:
Referenz nicht gefunden and 2.2.3. The equilibrium values for the access charge and the investment 








2−ss   (32)
where an asterisk denotes the equilibrium prices from the third stage of game, R stands for 



















The entrant is active in the market as long as δ takes a value within the shaded ranges depicted in 
the following graph:
As, by assumption, we only consider values δ ≥  1, we see that the upper (lower) bound is only 
binding for s ≥  ½ (0.919). For other values, the monopoly result is valid:  x R_M
VI = 1
2−1 .
21 This holds for all δ >= ½.
Figure 12: Upper and Lower Bound for δ as Conditions for Entry (Regulation)XII-32
 3 The Reverse Case
We assumed throughout this paper that the incumbent downstream company (i.e. that one that is 
bundled with the network operator) benefits from the investment because it provides high quality 
services. We motivate this assumption with the fact that in many countries in Europe the formerly 
state-owned and integrated railway operators offer high-speed train services. But one may imagine 
the reverse case: the incumbent offers (mainly) standard train services whereas the entrant supplies 
high-speed transport. In order to simulate the market outcome for this case, we re-formulate the 
model by assuming that the entrant offers high-quality services.
22
Looking at the performance indicators investment, consumer surplus, and welfare, we notice that all 
indicators are lower under VI and LU compared to the case where the incumbents provides high-
quality services. The reason for this outcome is the fact that the network operator cannot internalise 
as many of the benefits of its investment. For the higher willingness to pay, induced by the 
investment, accrues to the entrant. Therefore the double marginalisation effect is present which 
leads to lower investments. Hence consumer surplus and welfare are lower, too. The results under 
OU are equal to those in the previous section as all companies are independent and both 
downstream companies are identical.
 4 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we study the investment incentives for upstream quality upgrading under different 
organisational structures when differentiated products are supplied in the downstream market. The 
railway industry may serve as an example: The network operator decides on whether to upgrade the 
infrastructure, e.g. preparing the tracks for high-speed traffic. Infrastructure upgrades benefit only 
one of the downstream companies because the other company does not offer that type of service 
which requires an upgraded network. We analyse the investment incentives for the case of a 
vertically integrated, a vertically separated, and a legally unbundled industry. Moreover, we 
distinguish between a non-regulated benchmark case and a regulated regime.
Without regulation, we find that investment incentives and welfare are highest under vertical 
integration and legal unbundling because double marginalisation is low and benefits of the 
investment in both markets are best internalised. With regulation, the outcome of the vertical 
integration regime is superior to those of ownership and legal unbundling. In both regimes, 
22 The calculations can be provided upon request.XII-33
investment incentives are wiped out since the regulator does not allow a mark up on marginal cost. 
Although, investing could increase the profit of the legally unbundled company, there is no 
investment since the network operator does not internalise the effect of its investment on the 
business of its downstream parent company. Comparing this setting to the benchmark case yields 
that welfare is higher under vertical integration and ownership unbundling but lower under legal 
unbundling.
A tentative policy implication that can be drawn from this model concerns the importance of 
internalising the effects of investments: The more the investing business unit will benefit from the 
investment, the higher will be the incentives. Insofar, vertical integration seems a secure option to 
foster investment whereas legal unbundling may be detrimental to that if the network operator's 
profit is regulated because it does not internalise the effect on its parent company. 
Our results are partially driven by the linear-quadratic utility function. On the one hand this can be 
interpreted as a limitation to the model. On the other hand, we have not explicitly considered other 
problems that may arise when separating the industry. There are at least two groups of arguments 
that are closely related and that should be regarded in this context, too. First, several empirical 
studies have found economies of scope in integrated railway companies.
23 As we do not consider 
economies of scope, our approach can be classified as cautious. Second, a separated network from 
transport   operations   requires   a   lot   of   contracts   between   the   parties   involved.  This   makes 
coordination much harder
24 and may create hold-up problems which may lead to lower investment 
levels.
25
The findings are in contrast to previous literature on legal unbundling. HK (2011a/b) who also 
assumed that the network operator is unbundled, found that legal unbundling could generate highest 
quantities in the market. Their result strongly hinges on the assumptions of sabotage and an 
exogenous investment budget in combination with access regulation: The vertically integrated 
company has an incentive to discriminate against the competitor in the downstream market whereas 
this effect is ruled out if the network operator acts independently. In this model, we highlight the 
effect of differentiated products in a setting where quality-enhancing investments are endogenous to 
the model.
There are some limitations to the model and to the implications derived. First, it is assumed that 
each company offers only one variety of final consumer services. This is ad odds with reality 
23 cf. among others Bitzan (2003) and Growitsch/ Wetzel (2007).
24 cf. Gómez-Ibánez (2004), pp. 7-9, Pittman (2007).
25 cf. Hartwig et al. (2009).XII-34
because in Germany or France e.g., the incumbent railway operators offer a large variety of 
differentiated products, ranging from first class and second class coaches to coaches with silent and 
mobile-phone zones. But this critique can partially be rebutted considering the fact that the effects 
on vertical structures and investments are in the focus of this paper. Second, we assume that 
investments in quality upgrades only benefit the incumbent company. This assumption was made 
with regard to high-speed traffic which is, with rare exceptions, only offered by the incumbents. 
Insofar it is well-founded. Arguing in a future European context with interoperability all over the 
continent, this example would not necessarily hold because, potentially, the foreign incumbents 
could compete with their high-speed trains. Nonetheless, also in this setting, network investments 
that favour one downstream company will be possible because this constitutes a very general 
phenomenon in the railway industry.
26
To sum up, the assessment of efficient vertical structures in network industries still continues and 
deserves further attention.
26 cf. Gómez-Ibánez (2004), p. 333.XII-35
 5 Appendix: Results without Quality Investment
We restrict ourself here to report only the results after the last stage of the game, where “nx” after 
the supscript for the organisational regime stands for no investment in x. Note that there is never 
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